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Abstract
The objective of Web-based expert epidemic intelligence systems is to detect health threats. The Global Health Security
Initiative (GHSI) Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR) project was launched to assess the feasibility and opportunity for pooling
epidemic intelligence data from seven expert systems. EAR participants completed a qualitative survey to document
epidemic intelligence strategies and to assess perceptions regarding the systems performance. Timeliness and sensitivity
were rated highly illustrating the value of the systems for epidemic intelligence. Weaknesses identified included
representativeness, completeness and flexibility. These findings were corroborated by the quantitative analysis performed
on signals potentially related to influenza A/H5N1 events occurring in March 2010. For the six systems for which this
information was available, the detection rate ranged from 31% to 38%, and increased to 72% when considering the virtual
combined system. The effective positive predictive values ranged from 3% to 24% and F1-scores ranged from 6% to 27%.
System sensitivity ranged from 38% to 72%. An average difference of 23% was observed between the sensitivities calculated
for human cases and epizootics, underlining the difficulties in developing an efficient algorithm for a single pathology.
However, the sensitivity increased to 93% when the virtual combined system was considered, clearly illustrating
complementarities between individual systems. The average delay between the detection of A/H5N1 events by the systems
and their official reporting by WHO or OIE was 10.2 days (95% CI: 6.7–13.8). This work illustrates the diversity in
implemented epidemic intelligence activities, differences in system’s designs, and the potential added values and
opportunities for synergy between systems, between users and between systems and users.
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Introduction
Epidemic intelligence provides a new approach to address the
challenges of disease globalization [1–3]. It provides an approach
that is complementary to countries’ national surveillance strate-
gies. Moreover epidemic intelligence was included by the World
Health Organization (WHO) in the health threat detection
mechanisms integrated into the International Health Regulations
[4,5]. While epidemiological indicator-based surveillance relies on
regular reporting of a number of well-defined indicators provided
mainly by health care facilities, epidemic intelligence focuses on
event detection, prior to official health care reporting, laboratory
confirmation and eventual official notification. Epidemic intelli-
gence consists of the ad hoc detection and interpretation of
unstructured information available in the Internet. This informa-
tion is very diverse in nature and is generated by multiple types of
sources, both official and informal. The information may include
unverified rumors from the media or more reliable information
from official sources or traditional epidemiological surveillance
systems. These raw signals usually contain very little information
(e.g. medical or scientific) on which analysis can be performed, and
they are often embedded in noise. Epidemic intelligence is a
complex, time and resource-intensive process that includes a
formalized protocol for event selection, verification of the
genuineness of reported events, searches of complementary
reliable information, analysis and communication.
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Epidemic intelligence is still a relatively new discipline that
emerged in the 1990s triggered by the development of the
Internet. ProMED-mail [6] was the first Internet-based reporting
system to use both formal and informal sources. It was followed by
several expert systems developed to detect relevant information
from the Internet [7–10]. In parallel, national and international
institutions have developed epidemic intelligence capacities to
fulfill their own needs [8,11–14]. A number of studies [15–18]
have been carried out to assess expert systems’ abilities to detect
and correctly classify health threats using informal open sources or
to present innovative functionalities. These papers rarely address
users’ viewpoints (i.e., the detection of relevant information by
public health institutions). A thorough evaluation of epidemic
intelligence information faces major challenges, including the lack
of an adequate gold standard and standardized indicators and, but
also the type of information collected, which is often not designed
for health surveillance purposes.
The development of expert systems and epidemic intelligence
took place independently, resulting in both the development of
specific expertise among expert systems and institutions and,
varying degrees of duplication. This paper aims to present a
methodology and results that can be utilized to assess the
complementarity of expert systems’ capability and epidemic
intelligence frameworks.
Methods
The EAR Project
The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is an informal,
international partnership among like-minded countries aiming to
strengthen global health preparedness and response to chemical,
biological, radio-nuclear (CBRN) terrorism and pandemic influ-
enza threats. GHSI was launched in November 2001 by Canada,
the European Union (EU), France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States. The WHO
serves as an expert advisor to the GHSI [19]. In 2009, an
international project called Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR)
was established, bringing together end-users (i.e., public health
institutions in charge of epidemic intelligence), systems providers,
and stakeholders (see Tables 1 and 2). Its objective for 2009–2010
was to assess the feasibility of developing a single web-based
platform that would enable partners to access health threats
identified from open source web-based public health intelligence
systems, as well as to combine risk assessment processes.
Evaluation
The study included a qualitative (questionnaire-based) and a
quantitative assessment. The qualitative assessment’s goal was to
provide information essential for determining the best strategy for
the quantitative part of the study.
Qualitative analysis
A questionnaire was constructed to assess both the type of
epidemic intelligence performed by participating public health
institutions and their perception of the seven integrated expert
systems. The questionnaire, sent to ten EAR points of contact, was
self-administrated during the first quarter of 2010. In order to
measure the perceived performances of each system that they at
least occasionally utilize, users were asked to rate each system
through a simple choice (Yes/No). The following pre-defined
characteristics were measured: representativeness (of information
e.g., geographic coverage, type of diseases, etc.), completeness (or
‘‘exhaustivity’’ of information collected for the detected events),
timeliness (of reporting), sensitivity (of the system), usefulness (of
provided information), simplicity of use and flexibility of the
systems (adaptation to users needs’). Results were represented in
two-dimensional spider-charts of the proportion of users that
selected the corresponding attribute to describe the system
(denominator being the number of systems’ users). Participants
were also requested to describe epidemic intelligence activities
implemented in their institution in terms of priority domains of
interest (e.g., specific epidemic diseases, plant diseases, CBRN
agents, and natural disasters), the selection criteria, and frequency
of these activities.
Gold standard
A review was performed to identify a global health threat
covered by all participating expert systems, which was frequently
occurring and for which a ‘‘gold standard’’ exists. Highly
pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 (A/H5N1) was selected as
the most appropriate. Human and veterinary cases are subjected
to mandatory notification through WHO and the World
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). These two international
organizations constitute the most reliable and recognized source of
information regarding A/H5N1 biologically confirmed human
cases and epizootics. Human cases and epizootics (both single
cases of animal disease and larger outbreaks) that occurred in
March 2010 (date of first symptoms, date of the start of the
outbreak) or reported by WHO/OIE in March 2010 were
considered as the gold standard.
Quantitative analysis: Database and indicator analyses
Raw data. Despite intrinsic differences, expert systems
operate in similar ways. They search the Internet to detect
information potentially relevant for epidemic intelligence purpos-
Table 1. Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR), participating systems.
System name System owner/developer Country Moderation type
n users
2010* references
Expert systems Argus Georgetown University USA Human moderation 5 [29–31]
BioCaster National Institute of Informatics Japan Fully automated 4 [8,16,32]
GPHIN Public Health Agency of Canada Canada Human moderation 6 [1,9,33]
HealthMap Harvard University USA Partially moderated 5 [7,34,35]
MedISys Joint Research Centre EU Fully automated 5 [10,36,37]
ProMED-mail International Society of Infectious Diseases USA Human moderation 9 [6,17,23]
Puls University of Helsinki Finland Fully automated 4 [18,38,39]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057252.t001
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es, i.e., raw signals in unprocessed news articles, messages in
forums, official press releases, extracts from public official websites,
etc. These signals are then stored on dedicated web-based
platforms (specific to each system) accessible to end-users for their
assessment and verification.
Databases. Two different databases were constituted: The
first one (‘‘prospective’’) aimed at assessing the event detection
process under close to real life conditions (i.e., detecting pertinent
signals potentially relevant for the study among a large volume of
raw signals). The second (‘‘retrospective’’) database aimed at
assessing systems’ theoretical performances.
‘‘Prospective’’ database: Detection rate, Effective
Positive Predictive Value (EPPV), F1-score. All raw signals
detected between March 1 and March 31, 2010 that potentially
referred to an A/H5N1 event (human cases and epizootics) were
considered for the analysis. Raw signals were automatically
collected (through prospective specifically designed queries),
provided directly by the systems (i.e. datasets), or collected
manually (through retrospective ad hoc queries). From these data,
each signal captured by the systems was reviewed and classified as:
detected or inadequately detected. A detected (DET) event was
defined as the first report mentioning a human case or an epizootic
detected by a system in March 2010 and before the reporting of
this event by WHO/OIE on their respective websites. An
inadequately detected (XDET)) was defined as a signal initially
tagged A/H5N1, but after verification was found to be not related
to the occurrence of confirmed A/H5N1 cases, or an event
previously detected by the same system (i.e. duplicate), or an A/
H5N1 case report detected by a system after or on the same day as
the reporting of this event by WHO/OIE. A not-detected (NDET)
event was defined as an event reported by WHO/OIE but not
detected by the system in March 2010. True negative events could
not be considered because it is not possible to determine the total
number of reports issued on the Internet nor those events
discovered but not published by systems. The detection rate
(DR) was defined as the ability of a system to detect confirmed A/
H5N1 cases before their reporting by WHO/OIE (DR=DET/
(DET+NDET)). Effective Predictive Positive Value (EPPV) was
defined as the probability for the system to timely detect confirmed
A/H5N1 cases among all reports (EPPV=DET/(DET+XDET)).
The F1-score is the harmonic mean of DR and EPPV, weighted
equally [16] F1= 2*(EPPV*DR)/(EPPV+DR).
‘‘Retrospective’’ database: Sensitivity and
timeliness. For each event included in the gold standard (i.e.,
reported by WHO or OIE), a specific manual retrospective search
was performed on all systems to identify the first report related to
this event. No restriction was set on the time period in order to
capture both early and late event detection. A true positive (TP)
event was defined as the first report mentioning a human case or
an epizootic detected by a system before the reporting of the event
by WHO/OIE. A false negative (FN) event was defined as an
event not detected by the system. Sensitivity (Se =TP/(TP+FN))
was defined as the retrospective ability of a system to detect an
event included in the gold standard. Timeliness was defined as the
delay between official reporting and the detection by a system
(date of report on WHO/OIE websites minus date of first
detection by the system, in days). Common variables were used for
the analyses: mean, median, rates. Box plot graphs were made to
display timeliness, statistical measures and the ANOVA test was
used to compare mean values. All statistics were computed using
Stata 11.0 for Windows.
Type of events. When used with the terms DR, EPPV,
timeliness and Se, ‘‘overall’’ refer to animal and human cases.
Virtual combined system. In order to assess the comple-
mentarity and added value of combining the systems’ information,
a virtual system named ‘‘combined system’’ was constructed by
pooling signals detected by all systems.
Table 2. Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR) public health institutions and stakeholders.
Institution name Country
Public Health Institutions Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) United States (USA)
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) European Union (EU)
Health Protection Agency (HPA) United Kingdom
Institut de Veille Sanitaire (InVS) France
Istituto Superiore di Sanita` (ISS) Italy
National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID) Japan
Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) Canada
Robert Koch Institute (RKI) Germany
Stakeholders Ministries of Health Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Mexico
United Kingdom
United States
Directorate General for Health and Consumers of the European Commission (DG-SANCO)
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
World Health Organization (WHO) as observer
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057252.t002
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Results
Qualitative analysis
Ten users from seven countries and EU public health
institutions (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
European Commission (EC), European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC), Health Protection Agency
(HPA), Institut de Veille Sanitaire (InVS), Istituto Superiore di
Sanita` (ISS), National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID),
Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and Robert Koch
Institute (RKI)) participated in the survey. Respondents were
either the head of a unit or an epidemiologist in charge of
epidemic intelligence related activities within their institution.
Epidemic intelligence focus. According to participants,
epidemic intelligence processes varied widely. However, infectious
disease was the main focus for most of the experts involved in this
survey. All users systematically considered epidemic-prone diseases
in general, though, for some institutions the focus was set on
specific diseases. Only three countries monitored systematically
generic zoonoses in their routine activities. All events involving
potential bio-terrorism pathogens were systematically monitored
by three countries, while no country included systematically
radiological/nuclear and chemical threats in their routine
activities. Although, CBRN threats are of interest to all countries,
the bio-terrorism aspect (i.e., intentional release) was not
considered as pertinent from the detection perspective. Plant
diseases were included in the threat detection criteria of one
institution. Natural disasters were monitored according to specific
criteria (e.g., geographical, type and size of disaster).
Variations in system usage. Not all users had access or
used routinely all of the expert systems included in the study. Of
the seven systems four are freely accessible (BioCaster, Health-
Map, MedISys and ProMED-mail) and three have restricted
access (Argus, GPHIN and Puls). Nine of the ten respondents
utilized regularly at least one of the seven included systems; the
remaining respondent used other expert systems not included in
this survey. Users routinely accessed from four to seven different
systems and their utilization varied greatly. ProMED-mail was
used routinely by all respondents while utilization of the other six
systems ranged from 60% to 80%. When routinely used, Argus,
GPHIN and ProMED-mail were accessed on a daily basis.
GPHIN and ProMED-mail were predominantly used for early
prospective alert detection (60%), while others were used mostly as
a complementary source of information (e.g. to further document
already detected events). Finally, 60% of users also utilized other
epidemic intelligence systems that were not integrated into the
survey, e.g., RSOE-EDIS (Radio Distress-Signaling and Infocom-
munications, Emergency and Disaster Information Service) or
EpiSPIDER [20].
Systems’ users perception. The perceptions of users
regarding the system attributes (completeness, flexibility, repre-
sentativeness, sensitivity, simplicity, timeliness and usefulness) are
represented Figure 1. Timeliness scores ranged from 33% to 100%
and usefulness scores ranged from 40% to 100%. Simplicity was
the highest scored attribute with scores ranging from 60% to
100%. Sensitivity ranged from 0% (i.e., no user qualified the
system as sensitive) to 80%. The spider charts also highlighted the
global weaknesses perceived by users with lower scores for three
attributes: flexibility (17% to 60%), representativeness (25 to 50%)
and completeness (0 to 40%). Individual spider graphs tend to
have relatively similar surfaces, except for the less utilized systems
(,5 users).
Quantitative analysis: A/H5N1 data
Detection rate, positive predictive value & F1-score
(Table 3). A total of 1,154 signals potentially relating to A/
H5N1 events were collected. For the same period, 29 A/H5N1
events were reported by WHO (14 events) or OIE (15 events) and
were included in the gold standard. In regard to large differences in
terms of intrinsic systems’ characteristics, interface designs, database
storage or extraction capacities it has not been possible to implement
a homogenous data collection procedure across the seven systems.
For one system (GPHIN), the system design did not allow the
extraction or collection of data in a format compatible with this
analysis and as such 366 signals were excluded from the analysis. As
of July 30, 2010, six datasets were collected from the six other systems
for a total of 788 signals. Three of these datasets were collected
prospectively and three were collected retrospectively.
For the six systems, the overall detection rate (DR) ranged from
31% to 38%, from 29% to 57% for human cases and from 20% to
40% for epizootics. Differences in DR were observed between
human cases and epizootic events (the largest being 57% for
human cases versus 20% for epizootics). For the combined system
(pooled from six systems), the DR increased to 72% overall, to
93% for human cases and to 53% for epizootics. Overall EPPV
ranged from 3% to 24% and the F1-score ranged from 6% to
27%. The overall EPPV and F1-scores of the combined system
were 3% and 5%, respectively.
Sensitivity and Timeliness. Two events (7%) were not
detected by the systems before official notification, 6 (21%) events
were detected by only one system and only 2 (7%) were detected
by the seven systems (Table 4). Sensitivity ranged from 38% to
72% for overall A/H5N1 events, from 29% to 79% for human
cases and from 33% to 67% for epizootics. For five systems the
sensitivities were higher for human cases than for epizootics. When
considering the virtual combined system (seven systems) overall
sensitivity increased to 93%, 100% for human cases and 87% for
epizootics (Table 5). Timeliness for human cases detected by the
systems varied from 1.9 days (confidence interval 95%: 20.4; 4.1)
to 6.1 days (3.1; 9.1) before the reporting by WHO. For epizootics
the mean timeliness varied from 2.9 days (23.9; 9.7) to 12.7 days
(3.4; 22.0) before OIE reporting. Overall timeliness ranged from
2.2 days (0.5; 3.8) to 7.8 days (4.0; 11.5) before WHO/OIE
reporting. Differences observed among systems were not signifi-
cant (F-statistic calculated for analysis of variance (ANOVA)
= 0.553). For the combined system (pooled from seven systems),
events were detected on average 10.2 days (6.7; 13.8) before their
reporting by WHO/OIE, while timeliness for human cases was
6.9 days (4.2; 9.5) and 13.5 days (7.1; 19.9) for epizootics
(Figure 2).
Discussion
The results highlight how combining the expertise of multiple
epidemic intelligence systems could substantially increase sensitiv-
ity and timeliness. When the seven systems were pooled, the
sensitivity of the combined system increased to 93% and events
were detected on average 10.2 days earlier (21; 44 days), a period
of time that would indeed be crucial for implementation of control
measures in the case of a potential threat. The results also point
out the many challenges faced by the system, including the lack of
specificity of raw information, and the advances that need to be
achieved in this domain.
The qualities most frequently quoted by users in the qualitative
analysis were simplicity, usefulness and timeliness while flexibility,
representativeness and completeness received much lower scores.
The findings were corroborated by practices as all users routinely
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utilized four to seven different systems. Not all interviewees were
familiar with all systems and their routine utilization varied.
Although the global approach was similar, each institution has set
objectives and procedures that best suit their specifics needs. These
differences in both system design and user practice may have
influenced the perceptions. Intensively-used systems were more
susceptible to being assessed on users’ experience and according to
their ability to meet an institution’s goal (as opposed to their
intrinsic performance), while more theoretical opinions might have
been applied for seldom used systems. The number of interviewees
may appear as a limitation. However, the number of institutions
performing structured epidemic intelligence was very limited and
the people interviewed were key experts in their domain. It is
therefore unlikely that their views substantially differed from those
of the team and the institution they represented. We believe that it
is unlikely that adding a few additional people or institutions would
have resulted in significantly different results.
It must be stressed that system’s designs and functionalities are
very different [21]. The quantitative analysis was not designed to
compare systems’ performances and therefore comparison would
be misleading. Rather, the objective was to detect and document
diversity and potential complementarities from the end-user
perspective. Interpretations of these results should therefore avoid
pairwise system comparisons.
The goal of computing the detection rate was to assess the
capability of a system and the aptitude for a user to detect relevant
information from systems in a situation resembling real life
conditions. DR provides an estimate of the events adequately
Figure 1. Users’ perception regarding systems performances.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057252.g001
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tagged A/H5N1 during this period and detected as such by the
analyst. However, in order to have the same denominator (also
used for the EPPV estimation), events that could have been
detected before March 2010 were not included. The calculated
DRs are likely to be underestimated and hence should not be
regarded as a proxy for sensitivity. The overall DRs were very
similar (from 31% to 38%). These low scores could be attributed to
the non-inclusion of signals detected before March 1, 2010, but
also to the difficulty for an end-user to prospectively detect
relevant information in a large volume of noise.
The low measured EPPV and F1-scores illustrate the varying
ability of systems to adequately detect, efficiently sort-out, and
make accessible only the pieces of information relevant for
epidemic intelligence purposes while reducing the background
noise. The F1-score [16], by weighing them equally, can provide
good balance between EPPV and DR. System developers can
increase the F1 score by improving signal detection (e.g.,
expanding geographical coverage, languages, sources, etc.) and
or by reducing background noise (e.g., algorithms for de-
duplication). In this study, the F1 score was strongly impacted
by the high numbers of XDET and the EPPV, which can lower
the sensitivity performance (DR). In a period of one month and
considering only one clearly identified topic, A/H5N1, 1,154
documents were detected by the seven systems (on average 37 per
day), hence providing an indication of the volume of information
to be reviewed routinely when extended to an all hazard approach
(i.e., covering all potential health threats). The EPPV of the virtual
combined system was very low, however a genuine operational
combined system would include functionalities (e.g., de-duplica-
tion) that would substantially reduce the redundant information,
hence increasing performance.
No single system was able to detect all events included in the
gold standard before their public reporting by WHO or OIE.
Sensitivity varied from 38 to 72%. An average difference of 23%
was observed between the sensitivities calculated for human cases
and epizootics (Table 4) but no explanation was found for such a
large difference within and across systems. These findings,
however, underline the difference in conceptual design and the
associated performance, but also the difficulties met in developing
an efficient algorithm covering the different facets of a single
disease.
No significant difference (ANOVA =0.553) was observed
between system timeliness. The difference in the number of
detected events could have contributed to the observed variation.
Systems operated in different time zones and normalizing time
proved difficult (because time of posting was not retrievable for all
systems). Although for the systems for which information was
available, no difference was observed, an effect of the time of
posting could not be formally ruled out. Nevertheless, our findings
are consistent with other studies: HealthMap detected events
around 12 days before WHO publication and ProMED-mail
between 2 days and 2 weeks earlier than OIE when events were
Table 3. Detection rate, positive predictive value and F1 score for A/H5N1 human cases and epizootic detected by systems from
1st to 31st March 2010.
Systems Argus BioCaster HealthMap MedISys ProMED Puls
Combined
system (a)
Collection process Auto Auto Prov Prov Auto Prov -
n signals 103 95 126 347 37 80 788
A/H5N1 human
cases (H)
Detected 5 8 6 5 4 5 13
Not detected 9 6 8 9 10 9 1
Inadequately detected (b) 14 20 45 52 14 34 179
Detection rate 36% 57% 43% 36% 29% 36% 93%
EPPV 26% 29% 12% 9% 22% 13% 7%
F1 score 30% 38% 18% 14% 25% 19% 13%
A/H5N1
epizootics (V)
Detected 4 3 5 6 5 6 8
Not detected 11 12 10 9 10 9 7
Inadequately detected(d) 66 25 39 227 8 19 384
Detection rate 27% 20% 33% 40% 33% 40% 53%
EPPV 6% 11% 11% 3% 38% 24% 2%
F1 score 9% 14% 17% 5% 36% 30% 4%
Overall A/H5N1
cases (H+V)
Detected 9 11 11 11 9 11 21
Not detected 20 18 18 18 20 18 8
Inadequately detected (e) 94 84 115 336 28 69 767
Detection rate 31% 38% 38% 38% 31% 38% 72%
EPPV 9% 12% 9% 3% 24% 14% 3%
F1 score 14% 18% 14% 6% 27% 20% 5%
Auto: Automatically emailed; Prov: Provided by system.
(a) Virtual combined system pooling the 6 systems i.e. event detected by any of the system was considered as detected by the combined system, (d) differs from (b) + (d)
because it includes events that could not be categorized in human cases or epizootics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057252.t003
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detected by both sources [22], Argus detected confirmed cases of
pandemic (A/H1N1) from 1 to 16 days ahead of WHO for 42
countries [40]. No timeliness differences were found between
HealthMap, BioCaster and EpiSPIDER [20].
A number of limitations have been identified in this study. The
first one concerns the gold standard. The choice of A/H5N1
events was suggested by its public health significance and the
existence of an easy to access gold standard. Across affected
countries, access to health care, laboratory facilities, surveillance
systems, national protocols for biological confirmation (for both
human and animal diseases), control strategies vary greatly and
not all events will have samples submitted for biological
confirmation. Finally, reporting by both the WHO and OIE is
subjected to an official notification by a national authority, a
process that can take time and that is not always performed. The
limits of using WHO and OIE as a gold standard have already
been pointed out by previous studies [22–25], though very few
surveys proposed alternatives [26,27]. It is likely that only a
portion of genuine A/H5N1 occurrences was effectively reported
to WHO or OIE but the magnitude of this bias cannot be
estimated. Measured values (DR, EPPV and F1-score) could have
been underestimated. Nevertheless, reports classified as XDET
were often duplicates (redundant information) or misclassified
reports (not related to A/H5N1 cases) as opposed to non-verified
events. The impact on the EPPV and F1-score is likely to have
been limited while the effect of this potential bias might be more
important for DR and Se. It cannot be assumed that the weight of
the bias was evenly distributed and that the performances of
individual systems were likely to have been affected in different
ways.
Despite the heterogeneity of designs [21] the same methodology
had to be used for all systems. This uniform approach allowed for
Figure 2. Timeliness of the systems for A/H5N1 cases (total, human, epizootic) reported in March 2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057252.g002
Table 4. Number of gold standard events detected by the systems.
Not detected Detected by
1 system 2 systems 3 systems 4 systems 5 systems 6 systems 7 systems
n 2 6 3 1 2 8 5 2
% 7% 21% 10% 3% 7% 28% 17% 7%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057252.t004
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the provision of a global overview, but did not reflect adequately
the large variability of systems’ functionalities and genuine
performances. The systems are in constant evolution (internal
methodology, algorithms, etc.), but for a short study period such
changes are likely to be minor and not impact the results. This
study was implemented in the scope of EAR and the results had to
be delivered within a fixed time frame. The assessment was thus
intentionally performed over a short period and was focused on
only one topic (A/H5N1) in order to keep the number of signals
relatively small. This evaluation could not integrate all potentially
important elements, such as languages, geographical distribution,
type of sources, interconnections among systems, and others.
Excluding such parameters may limit the results generalizability,
but despite these limitations and potential biases, the results
provided a global perspective and a characterization of the
complexity of epidemic intelligence under ‘‘real life’’ conditions. In
the scope of EAR, the study results helped to inform future
research strategies, i.e., identifying each system’s strengths and
defining mechanisms that will allow more efficient synergies and
cross-fertilization of knowledge and information as opposed to
attempting to strengthen ‘‘the best of the systems’’ or to create a
‘‘new system’’.
Conclusions
This study emphasized the added value, and synergistic
qualities: between systems, among users and between systems
and users. The complexity and the diversity of the epidemic
intelligence approaches and the vast expertise developed by the
systems are much broader than what could be described in this
article [9]. Despite the systems’ success, both systems and
institutions face major challenges [28] such as the rapidly
escalating volume of Internet information, the changing type of
communication and information dissemination (i.e., social net-
works and brief, instantaneous communications) and the manage-
ment of large volumes of data. Levels of duplicative information
and noise are very high and international collaboration is still
limited. No super-system exists to pool expert systems’ expertise
and more initiatives must be developed in this direction. More
research needs to be carried out, including longer study periods,
different types of health events and more robust gold standards.
Also additional users and other systems’ perspectives should be
considered. Overall, this relatively easy to implement study
constitutes a first step that will hopefully pave the way for
continued exploration in this challenging, but essential component
of the global and nations’ health security processes and initiatives.
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